Western New England Law Review
Volume 31 31 (2009)
Issue 2 SYMPOSIUM ON HEALTH CARE
TECHNOLOGY: REGULATION AND
REIMBURSEMENT

Article 6

1-1-2009

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/CIVIL
PROCEDURE—TRAP FOR THE UNWARY:
THE 2005 AMENDMENTS TO
CONNECTICUT'S CERTIFICATE OF MERIT
STATUTE
Brett J. Blank

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Brett J. Blank, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/CIVIL PROCEDURE—TRAP FOR THE UNWARY: THE 2005 AMENDMENTS TO
CONNECTICUT'S CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTE, 31 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 453 (2009),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

NOTES
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/CIVIL PROCEDURE-TRAP FOR
THE

UNWARY:

THE

2005

AMENDMENTS

TO

CONNECTICUT'S

CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTE

A "case should not be decided solely on the basis of the literal
meaning of a word. ... When that meaning has led to absurd or
futile results, ... this Court has looked beyond the words to the
purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain
meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreason
able one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal
words. "1
INTRODUCTION

In February 2003, Lawrence Santorso was a patient at Bristol
Hospital in Bristol, Connecticut, receiving treatment for pancrea
titis 2 and undergoing surgery on his gallbladder and pancreas. 3
During a routine x-ray, a fifteen-millimeter nodule was discovered
in his lungs. 4 Radiologists reviewed the images and noted in three
separate reports that further examination was necessary.5 The re
ports were added to Santorso's file and sent to the physicians who
were responsible for his treatment. 6
In 2005, Santorso was admitted to Veterans Affairs Hospital in
West Haven, Connecticut, for treatment of osteomyelitis7 and an
1. Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544, 553 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (dissenting
opinion) (second omission in original) (quoting Simonette v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 338
A.2d 453, 457 (Conn. 1973) (Bogdanski, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (originating this general interpretation of
the plain meaning rule).
2. Pancreatitis is "inflammation of the pancreas." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COL·
LEGIATE DlcnONARY 894 (11th ed. 2004) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
3. Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 724 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Osteomyelitis is an infection of the bone. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 2, at 878.
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ulceration of his heel. 8 In June 2005, during the course of treat
ment, Santorso's physician ordered a chest x-ray.9 This x-ray un
covered the same mass that had been discovered in 2003.)0 As a
result, the physician obtained Santorso's records from Bristol Hos
pital.)l A pathology report revealed that Santorso had malignant,
metastatic squamous cell carcinoma-lung cancer.J2 Subsequent
reports revealed that not only had the masses enlarged during the
intervening two years, but the cancer also had metastasized outside
his lungs to his lymph nodes and surrounding tissues. \3 Santorso
died as a result of his lung cancer on September 17, 2007. 14
Before his death, Santorso filed a medical malpractice com
plaint against Bristol Hospital and the physicians who treated
him.ls On July 5, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that Santorso failed to comply with General Statute of
Connecticut section 52-190a. This statute, as amended in 2005, re
quires anyone filing a medical malpractice claim to make
a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to deter
mine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has
been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. The
complaint ... shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party
filing the action ... that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a
good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each
named defendant .... To show the existence of such· good faith,
the claimant or the claimant's attorney ... shall obtain a written
and signed opinion of a similar health care provider ... that there
appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a de
tailed basis for the formation of such opinion. 16

Failure to include the documentation required under section 52
190a "shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action."17
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Santorso,42 Conn. L Rptr. at 724.
[d.
Id.
[d.
[d.
13. [d.
14. Obituary, Lawrence Santorso, THE BRISTOL PRESS, available at http://www.
bristolpress.com/articles!2007 /09/18/obituariesI18826882.prt (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
15. Santorso, 42 Conn. L Rptr. at 724. These facts seem to factually support a
claim for loss of chance of life. See Turner W. Branch, Misdiagnosis of Cancer and Loss
of Chance, in 30 AM. JUR. Trials §§ 237,248 (1983) (stating that "if the defendant physi
cian destroyed the victim's chance of survival, however remote, he is held liable").
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(a) (2007).
17. Id. § 52-190a(c) (emphasis added).
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Santorso admitted that he failed to attach these documents to
his complaint, and he filed a memorandum in opposition to defen
dants' motion, attaching the required certificate and opinion.1 8 Al
though Santorso's complaint was not dismissed,19 other complaints
with similar flaws have met a much different fate. 20
Connecticut courts have not been uniform in interpreting the
statute. They have divided on the issue of whether claims that fail
to include the required documentation should be dismissed. 21
Many courts take the position that the required good faith certifi
cate and written opinion are prerequisites to a trial court's exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction.22 As a result, these courts hold, all
complaints lacking these documents must be dismissed because the
jurisdictional hurdle formed by the statute bars amendment. Other
courts take the position that potentially meritorious claims should
not be dismissed because of failure to comply with hyper-technical,
18. Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 724. The Certificate of Reasonable Inquiry
that must be included states:
I hereby certify that I have made a reasonable inquiry, as permitted by
the circumstances, to determine whether there are grounds for a good faith
belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.
This inquiry has given rise to a good faith belief on my part that grounds exist
for an action against each named defendant.
I have obtained a written, signed opinion of a similar health care pro
vider, as defined in c.G.s. Sec. 52-184c, that there appears to be evidence of
medical negligence, and detailing the basis for the formation of that opinion. I
have retained the original, signed opinion, and have attached a copy thereof
hereto, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider ex
punged, as provided by c.G.s. Sec. 52-190a(a).
2 JOEL M. KAYE & WAYNE D. EFFRON, CONN. PRACrICE SERIES: CIv. PRACrICE
FORMS 101.13 (4th ed. Supp. 2008). This form must be signed by the attorney or the
party filing the action.
19. Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 724.
20. See infra Part 1.C.2.
21. See Landi v. Wertheim, No. CV065001608S, 2006 WL 2949103, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2006) (noting the split in authority as to whether failure to include the
required certificate implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction).
22. See Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 840 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2007); Landry v. Zborowski, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56, 58 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), va
cated in part by Landry v. Zborowski, No. TIDCV076000211S, 2007 WL 4105519
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2007) (vacating on reargument part of the original decision
to dismiss the entire complaint on the grounds that one count of the complaint sounded
in informed consent, not medical malpractice, and thus that count should not have been
dismissed); Kirkpatrick v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 519,520 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2006); Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375, 376 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2006); Kudera v.· Ridgefield Physical Therapy, LLC, No.
DBDCV065000993S, 2006 WL 2773651, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006); An
drikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222, 225 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
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though well-intentioned, pleading rules. 23 These courts hold that
the plain language of the statute does not compel dismissal of these
complaints. 24 Instead, the statute grants discretion to the courts to
determine whether the complaint should be dismissed. 25
Though this statute was passed as a means to combat a per
ceived medical malpractice crisis by preventing the filing of frivo
lous claims,26 the solution to the problem, if one exists, is not
mandatory dismissal of claims for a deficiency in pleading. This is
too draconian a remedy for a problem that may not even exist. Fur
ther, even if there is a need to affirmatively prevent frivolous law
suits, mandating dismissal of all claims that lack the required
documents unfairly limits access to justice and undermines the goals
of the tort system.
Part I of this Note provides a description of the evolution of
section 52-190a. This Part explores prior interpretations, the legis
lative history of the 2005 amendments, and how those amendments
have been interpreted by the Connecticut trial courts. This Part
also explores the laws of other states that have chosen to address
their perceived medical malpractice crises through heightened
pleading laws. Part II begins by interpreting the statute, both the
plain language, and the legislative history. These sections conclude
that both the statutory language and its legislative history do not
reflect an intent to mandate dismissal of deficient complaints. Part
III begins by considering issues of public policy. First, the statute is
examined in light of Connecticut's goal of ensuring that cases are
resolved on their merits, rather than dismissed on procedural
23. See Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 726 (holding that failure to include the
required certificate is a curable 'deficiency); see also Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr.
806,808 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 613 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2006).
24. See, e.g., Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 726.
25. See infra Part I.C.I.
26. See Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795,
802 (Conn. 1997) ("The purpose of the legislation is to inhibit a plaintiff from bringing
an inadequately investigated cause of action, whether in tort or in contract, claiming
negligence by a health care provider."). Many debate whether the United States actu
ally is in the midst of a medical malpractice crisis. Compare Lindsay J. Stamm, The
Current Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Need for Reform to Ensure a Tomorrow for
Oregon's Obstetricians, 84 OR. L. REV. 283, 283 (2005) (arguing that there is a medical
malpractice crisis), with Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio),
Stupid: Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Criti
cal to Reform, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2004) ("[T]here has never been a
medical malpractice litigation crisis, per se. Rather, if anything, there have been cycli
cal insurance crises throughout the years, crises that have to do more with fluctuations
in the bond market than anything associated with medical malpractice litigation.").
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grounds. Next, traditional notions of access to justice and the goals
of the tort system are explored. Lastly, this Part examines the med
ical malpractice pleading laws in other states and compares them to
those of Connecticut. This Note concludes that the most prudent
approach to interpreting section 52-190a is to allow amendment of
procedurally defective complaints-dismissal should not be
mandated.
I.

A.

SECTION 52-190a: PAST AND CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND A COMPARISON TO
THE ApPROACHES OF OTHER STATES

Prior Interpretation of Section 52-190a

Though section 52-190a has been amended multiple times, its
purpose has remained consistent-to prevent the filing of frivolous
medical malpractice claims.27 When section 52-190a was first en
acted, the consequences of failing to include the required certificate
were unclear. 28 The statute specified no remedy. Thus, until the
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled on the matter in 1990, it was un
clear "whether the failure to file a 'good faith' certificate as part of
a medical malpractice suit [was] a jurisdictional defect."29
In 1990, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided LeConche v.
Elligers .30 The issue confronting the court was whether the legisla
ture intended to make the good faith certificate an additional juris
dictional requiremenPl The court noted that, based on the
purpose of the statute, failure to include the certificate did not de
stroy the jurisdiction that otherwise existed. 32 The court remarked
that "[t ]he purpose [of the statute] is just as well served by viewing
the statutory requirement that the complaint contain a good faith
certificate as a pleading necessity akin to an essential allegation to
support a cause of action. "33 Any deficiencies can be addressed
27. See Mastrone, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375; see also Bruttomesso, 698 A.2d at 802.
28. See Albert Zakarian & Barry D. Guliano, Survey of Connecticut Tort Law:
/990, 65 CONN. B.l. 171, 173 (1991).
29. [d.
30. LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1990).
31. [d. at 6. The court noted that '''[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the power of
the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong.'" [d. at 5-6 (quoting Shea v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 439 A.2d
997,999 (Conn. 1981)).
32. [d. at 6.
33. [d.; see also 1 WESLEY W. HORTON & KIMBERLY A. KNox, CONN. PRACrICE
SERIES: SUPER. CT. CIv. RULES § 10-39, at 507-08 (2008 ed.) (stating that before the
amendment of section 52-190a, the appropriate method for attacking a failure to supply
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through amendment. 34 As a result, the court held that "in enacting
[section] 52-190a, the legislature did not intend to make the good
faith certificate a jurisdictional requirement."35
Before 2005, the thrust of the issue surrounding the interpreta
tion of section 52-190a was whether the legislature showed a strong
intent to make the good faith certificate a jurisdictional prerequi
site. 36 Although LeConche had answered this question in the nega
tive, the statute was amended in 2005 to add an enforcement
provision. 37 The question then became whether this addition re
flected a legislative intent to implicate the trial courts' subject mat
ter jurisdiction.
B.

Legislative History of the 2005 Amendment

The 2005 amendments to section 52-190a began as Senate Bill
(S.B.) 1052. 38 Senator Louis C. DeLuca of the 32d District and
Representative Robert M. Ward of the 86th District were the initial
sponsors. As introduced, the bill's enforcement mechanism read:
"[f]ailure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsec
tion (a) of this section shall be grounds for immediate dismissal of
the action to recover damages that alleges that injury or death re
sulted from the negligence of a health care provider. "39 After re
view, the Judiciary Committee revised this provision to say: "[t]he
failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection
(a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action. "40
Thus, the Judiciary Committee removed the word "immediate"
from the statute's enforcement clause. And, it is this language that
was ultimately enacted. 41
a good faith certificate was a motion to strike). Thus, a complaint lacking a certificate
was not subject to a motion to dismiss.
34. LeConche, S79 A.2d at 6.
3S. Id. at S.
36. See id.
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § S2-190a(c) (2007).
38. S. lOS2, 200S Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S), available at http://www.
cga.ct.gov/200SrrOB/s/pdfl200SSB-010S2-ROO-SB.pdf.
39. S. lOS2, 200S Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S), available at http://www.
cga.ct.gov/200S/tob/s/200SSB-0l0S2-ROO-SB.htm (emphasis added).
40. Sub. S. 10S2, 200S Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S), available at http://
www.cga.ct.gov/200S/tob/s/200SSB-010S2-ROl-SB.htm.
41. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § S2-190a(c). These amendments were met with luke
warm support. Some applauded strengthening the requirement of a good faith certifi
cate. See, e.g., JUDICIARY COMM., STATE OF CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REPORT ON
BILLS FAVORABLY REPORTED BY COMMITTEE, S. Substitute Bill lOS2, 200S Gen. As
sem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S) (statement of Patrick J. Monahan, Vice President & Gen.
Counsel, Connecticut Hospital Association), available at http://www.cga.ct.govI200S/jfr/
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Overall, the purpose of the statute remained the same
preventing the filing of baseless claims. Representative Lawlor
noted that the amendment "makes it much more difficult to bring a
medical malpractice action in court. Under this requirement, an
other medical provider would have to state, in explicit detail, his or
her opinion that this is a meritorious claim."42 Further, Senator
McDonald remarked that "[t]he failure to attach such an opinion
would require the court to dismiss the case."43
The amendments to section 52-190a were part of a comprehen
sive overhaul of Connecticut's medical malpractice system. 44 Part
of the reform was designed to ensure that insurance companies
would still write malpractice policies in Connecticut as many prov
iders stated "that they were not interested in writing medical mal
practice insurance in Connecticut unless there was significant tort
reform."45 Yet, the main catalyst for this bill was a desire to combat
the steady rise in malpractice insurance rates for Connecticut
physicians. 46

s/2005SB-0l052-ROOJUD-JFR.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (stating that the Con
necticut Hospital Association supported strengthening the good faith certificate re
quirement). Others argued that retaining the good faith certificate was not a
sufficiently strong reform. See, e.g., id. (statement of Dr. Jonathan G. Greenwald)
(stating his opposition to the good faith certificate as "they are ineffective"; instead, he
sought adoption of pre-trial screening panels). Those who claimed that S.B. 1052 did
not go far enough argued instead that Connecticut should require pre litigation of all
medical malpractice claims by a prelitigation panel, composed of two attorneys and two
physicians. See id.
42. House Session Transcript June 8, 2005, 2005 Gen. Assem. 14 (Conn. 2005)
(statement of Rep. Mike Lawlor). Further, prior to amendment of the statute, the re
quired good faith certificate did not need to be attached to the complaint. OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR BILL ANALYSIS, S. Substitute
B. 1052,2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/
2005/BN2005SB-0l052-ROl-BA.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). In fact, the plaintiff
did not need the opinion of a similar medical professional to show the required good
faith. [d. The amendment changed this, requiring that all complaints sounding in medi
cal negligence include a written opinion from another doctor. [d.
43. See Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544, 550 n.9 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); 48 S.
Proc., Pt. 14, 2005 Sess. (Conn. 2005) (statement of Sen. McDonald).
44. House Session Transcript June 8,2005, supra note 42 (statement of Rep. Mike
Lawlor) (noting that there are many different provisions in this legislation).
45. S. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON BILLS FAVORABLY REPORTED BY
COMMITTEE, Bill No.: S.B. 1052 at 1 (Conn. 2005).
46. House Session Transcript June 8, 2005, supra note 42 (statement of Rep. Mike
Lawlor).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

460

. C.

[Vol. 31:453

The Current Version of Section 52-190a and Its Interpretation

The 2005 amendment enlarged the scope of subsection 52
190a(a) and added subsection (C).47 Subsection 52-190a(c) ad
dresses the consequences of failing to attach the required certifi
cate, stating: "The failure to obtain and file the written opinion
required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the
dismissal of the action."48 Connecticut trial courts have struggled
with interpreting this section,49 and the appellate court has ren
dered only one decision interpreting it. 50
1.

The Rationale for Holding Dismissal Is Discretionary

In interpreting the statute, some courts have held that the deci
sion to dismiss the complaint for failure to include the required cer
tificate is discretionary.51 For example, the court in Donovan v.
Sowell noted that although the legislature seemed to be trying to
make the certificate and written opinion a requirement for bringing
an action for medical malpractice, it was not clear that the legisla
ture was trying to make the certificate and written opinion a pre
requisite for the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 52 Though the
statute specifies dismissal as a remedy for a defective complaint,
[i]t does not state ... that a plaintiff's failure to comply with
these requirements deprives the court of subject matter jurisdic
tion, or ... that dismissal is mandatory. In other words, the lan
47.

An Act Concerning Medical Malpractice, Sub. S. 1052, Pub. Act No. 05-275,

§ 2, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007).

49. See, e.g., Landi v. Wertheim, No. CV065001608S, 2006 WL 2949103, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2006) (noting the split in authority as to whether failure to
include the required certificate implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction).
50. See Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544, 550-51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (hold
ing that "[t]he plain language of [subsection (c)] ... expressly provides for dismissal" of
deficient complaints). Though the court does not expressly state that a deficient com
plaint must be dismissed, it is implied through its quotation of Senator Andrew McDon
ald. See id. at 550 n.9.
51. See Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401-02 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2007); Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007);
Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 610-13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
52. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 611. The court stated:
The language that the legislature used in subsection (a) suggests that the
legislature intended the filing of the written opinion to serve as a sort of "juris
dictional" hurdle that a plaintiff must pass in order to maintain a medical mal
practice action. The type of jurisdiction that the legislature had in mind,
however, is not obvious from a preliminary reading of the text of the statute.
Id.
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guage ... is not the type of mandatory language that can only be
read as implicating the court's subject matter jurisdiction.53

The court noted that Connecticut has "a presumption in favor
of subject matter jurisdiction," and as a result, "a strong showing of
legislative intent" is required to rebut that presumption. 54 Further,
"[e]ven when mandatory language is used in such statutes ... 'such
language alone does not overcome the strong presumption of juris
diction, nor does such language alone prove strong legislative intent
to create a jurisdictional bal.' "55 In light of these principles, the
court stated that the plain language of section 52-i90a(c) does not
provide the required "strong showing of legislative intent"56 that
"would implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction."57
Continuing, the court observed that there was no other evi
dence that the legislature intended such a result:
The source of a court's [subject matter] jurisdiction is the
constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is created ....
The Superior Court of this state "shall be the sole court of origi
nal jurisdiction [except such actions over which the courts of pro
bate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute]."58

Further, the court pointed out that Connecticut trial courts tradi
tionally have jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims.59 In the
same vein, the court in Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc. noted
that "the ability to sue for professional negligence is a common-law
right given to citizens to redress their grievances in the only practi
cal forum available-i.e. the courts. Before that right is circum
scribed it must be absolutely clear that the legislature intended to
curtail its exercise."60
The court in Donovan then addressed the use of the word
"shall" in section 52-i90a(c).61 Although the word "shall" appears
53.
54.

[d.
[d. (quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777

A.2d 645, 651 (Conn. 2001».
55. [d. (quoting Williams, 777 A.2d at 653).
56. [d. (quoting Williams, 777 A.2d at 651).
57.

58.

[d.
[d. (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Demar v. Open Space &

Conservation Comm'n, 559 A.2d 1103, 1107-08 (Conn. 1989».
59. [d. (quoting LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1,6 (Conn. 1990».
60. Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401-02 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2007). Similar arguments have been used to strike down medical malpractice
pleading statutes in other states. See, e.g., Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 866-67
(Okla. 2006).
61. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 612.

462

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:453

in the statute's enforcement clause and "has often been held to be
mandatory ... its use in this section does not mandate that such a
certificate is jurisdictional. "62 Instead, the Connecticut Supreme
Court has articulated a test for determining whether "shall" is
mandatory or discretionary.63 The court must examine whether the
action to be taken (in this case dismissal) "is of the essence of the
thing to be accomplished. "64 The court reasoned that since the
overarching goal of section 52-190a is to prevent the filing of frivo
lous lawsuits,65 the required certificate is not "so central to that pur
pose that it is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished."66
Instead, the court stated that the purpose of the statute is better
served by treating the good faith certificate as a "pleading necessity
akin to an essential allegation to support a cauSe of action."67 Thus,
the court held that failing to include the required certificate is a
curable deficiency.68
The court then observed that this holding was consistent with
the statutory consequences for filing a false certificate, which had
not changed since LeConche. 69 The statute provides that as a con
sequence of filing a false certificate, the court shall impose an ap
propriate sanctionJo The court reasoned that since dismissal would
be a possible consequence for filing a false certificate, "it is clear
that such a dismissal would be discretionary, rather than required
due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction."71 The court further rea
soned that it would be bizarre to mandate dismissal when a party
"merely fail[ s]" to file the required certificate, but leave dismissal
discretionary when a party files a false certificateJ2
Other courts have held, based on the plain meaning of the stat
ute, that a failure to obtain and file the required certificate is not a
jurisdictional defectJ3 For example, the court in Greer v. Norbert
Id. (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6).
Id.
64. Id. (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6).
65. See Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795,
802 (Conn. 1997).
66. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 612 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6).
67. Id.
68. [d. (citing LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6).
62.

63.

69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
2007).

[d.
[d.

[d. at 612-13 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6).
[d. at 613 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6).
See, e.g., Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 808 (Conn. Super. Ct.
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examined the word "grounds" as it was used in subsection (C).?4
The court looked at multiple definitions, and held that they all led
to the conclusion that the court has discretion to determine whether
a complaint should be dismissed for failure to file the required cer
tificate. 75 In light of the definitions, and the fact "that the statute
does not say 'the action shall be dismissed,'" the court found that it
had discretion to determine whether to dismiss the compiainP6
2.

The Rationale for Holding That Dismissal Is Mandatory

Other courts have found that the plain meaning of the statute
compels dismissal when the plaintiff fails to file the required certifi
cate and opinion.?7 The Connecticut Superior Court stated that
"[a]n application of the commonly approved usage of the English
language to this statute surely compels the conclusion that the
above provision requires dismissal of the case if plaintiff did not
obtain and file any opinion at all. "78 The court noted that "[a ]ny
other action would render the language of the statute superfluous"
and thus in contradiction with one of the canons of statutory con
struction.?9 In a separate opinion, the court recognized that the re
sult, then, is that "[o]nly those cases commenced by a complaint
with the written opinion of a medical provider attached to the com
plaint ... may be heard and, thus, failure to attach the required
opinion implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction."80
74. ld. at 807.
75. ld. at 808. The court turned to legal dictionaries, noting that Black's Law
Dictionary defines "ground" as "[t]o provide a basis for something (such as e.g., a legal
claim or argument)," id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 723 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]), and that Ballentine's Law Dic
tionary defines "ground" as "[a] point; a reason; support for a cause or action. The
basis for taking a step in an action," id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (3d ed. 1969)).
76. ld. at 807-08.
77. See Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 840 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2007); Landry v. Zborowski, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56, 58 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), va
cated in part by Landry v. Zborowski, No. TIDCV076000211S, 2007 WL 4105519
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2007) (vacating on reargument part of the original decision
to dismiss the entire complaint on the grounds that one count of the complaint sounded
in informed consent, not medical malpractice, and thus that count should not have been
dismissed); Kirkpatrick v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 519, 520 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2006); Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375, 376 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2006); Kudera v. Ridgefield Physical Therapy, LLC, No.
DBDCV065000993S, 2006 WL 2773651, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006); An
drikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222, 225 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
78. Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. at 57.
79. ld. at 58.
80. Mastrone, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 376.
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Further, some courts have held that the legislative history sup
ports the idea that the certificate and written opinion form a pre
requisite for the court's subject matter jurisdiction.81 The court in
Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Medicine 82 reviewed the legislative
history in depth and found the following statement by Senator
Kissel:
[R]equiring a plaintiff to obtain and file a detailed opinion sup
porting good faith would 'help the defense counsel and their cli
ents right into the ballpark, right at the inception of the medical
malpractice case ... [because it would allow] ... counsel and
their clients [to] really narrow down exactly what was the basis
for the determination of the basis for the plaintiff's claim that
there was medical malpractice and why they had brought that
case. 83

Other legislators noted during these hearings that the purpose of
the legislation was to make bringing a malpractice claim more diffi
cult. 84 As a result of these statements, the court concluded that the
"legislative intent indicate[s] that the requirement of obtaining and
filing an opinion was intended as a jurisdictional hurdle for medical
malpractice actions. "85
After reviewing the legislative history, the court in Peloso v.
Walgreen Eastern Co. concluded that the failure to include the re
quired certificate and opinion mandates dismissa1. 86 Great weight
was placed on a remark by Senator McDonald that the "failure to
attach such an opinion would require the court to dismiss the
case."87 Given the legislature's stated goal of ensuring quick reso
lution of medical malpractice claims,88 the court reasoned that
"[ a ]llowing the court jurisdiction to order the plaintiff to amend his
complaint in the face of a pending motion to dismiss would contra
vene this goal of speedier process. "89 As a result, the court con
81.

See, e.g., Peloso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 841 n.9; Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at

225.

82. Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222.
83. Id. at 225 (quoting Senate Session Transcript June 6,2005,2005 Gen. Assem.
(Conn. 2005) (statement of Sen. Richard Kissel, Ranking Member of the Committee on
Aging».
84. See id. (citing House Session Transcript June 8, 2005, supra note 42).
85. Id.
86. Peloso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 841 n.9.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

2009]

TRAP FOR THE UNWARY

465

cluded that it lacked the power to order amendment-it did not
have the discretion to order any remedy besides dismissa1. 9o
This approach was essentially endorsed by the Appellate Court
of Connecticut in Rios v. CCMC Corp.91 Though the court did not
analyze the reasoning of the trial courts that have interpreted sec
tion 52-190a(c), it held that the 2005 amendment overruled LeCon
che.92 In conclusion, the court held that "[t]he plain language of
this new statutory subsection, which was not in effect at the time of
LeConche ... , expressly provides for dismissal of an action when a
plaintiff fails" to comply with the statute. 93
D.

The Approaches of Other States to Medical Malpractice
Actions

Connecticut is one of many states that has identified medical
malpractice suits as a special class of actions. 94 Many states require
heightened pleading similar to that present in Connecticut. 95 Illi
nois even used identicallanguage. 96 However, some of these states
have set up a different statutory framework. 97 For example, Minne
90. Id.; see also Kudera v. Ridgefield Physical Therapy, LLC, No.
DBDCV065000993S, 2006 WL 2773651, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006).
91. Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
92. Id. at 550.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853
(Supp. 2006); GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671
12.5 (LexisNexis 2007); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.2912d (West 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (Supp. 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 538.225 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-105 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41A.071 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-20.1 (2007); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1806 (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1
1708.1E (West 2004), invalidated by Zeier v. Zimmer, 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2006).
95. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6853; GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1; HAW.
REV. STAT. § 671-12.5; MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.2912d; MINN. STAT. § 145.682; MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-1-58; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225; NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071;
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 3012-a; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-20.1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-1708.lE.
Some states also require presentation of the claim to a medical malpractice review
board or other similar body. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18 § 6803; HAW. REV. STAT. § 671.12; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-105; WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-2-1806. In lieu of requiring a plaintiff to find a physician willing to write a letter
stating that there is evidence of medical negligence, these review bodies examine the
evidence and determine whether the claim should proceed.
96. 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2003), invalidated by Best V. Taylor Mach.
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (holding that this statute was unconstitutional only
because the statute would be meaningless without other statutes that were explicitly
struck down).
97. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.682.

466

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:453

sota, unlike Connecticut, has a demand requirement. 98 Under this
statute, the plaintiff has sixty days to produce the required affidavit
after the defendant demands it. 99
Many states have had issues with their certificate of merit stat
utes because defendants had begun to use them as a sword, rather
than a shield, in an attempt to avoid liability.lOo For instance, in
New Jersey, as a result of the dismissal of many seemingly meritori
ous claims,101 judges have felt compelled to invoke the substantial
compliance doctrine in order to prevent injustice.102 It would be
hoove Connecticut courts to be aware of these problems while con
struing Connecticut's certificate of merit statute.
II.

CONNECTICUT COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO DISMISS
ALL PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT COMPLAINTS
UNDER SECTION 52-190a

In this Part, section 52-190a is interpreted in accordance with
the rules of statutory construction. Section A examines the plain
language of the statute, noting the rule in Connecticut that a strong
showing of intent is required to create a barrier to the court's sub
ject matter jurisdiction. This Section concludes that not only is such
intent lacking on the face of the statute, but instead the statutory
language affirmatively reflects an intent to give the court discretion
in determining whether dismissal is warranted. This Section also
analyzes the cases that conclude that the statute creates a jurisdic
tional bar, and points out their flaws. Section B further explores
the intent of the legislature in amending section 52-190a. First,
early drafts of the 2005 amendments to the statute are explored.
Next, subsection (c) of the statute is examined in light of the rest of
the statute. Further, this Section explores the viability of prior case
law, principally LeConche v. Elligers. Lastly, this Section explores
the goals of section 52-190a and concludes that the legislature has
98. Id. § 145.682(6)(a).
99. Id.
100. See Abbott S. Brown, The Affidavit of Merit Mess, 163 NEW JERSEY L.J. 427,
427 (2001); see also Melinda L. Stroub, Note, The Unforeseen Creation of a Procedural
Minefield-New Jersey's Affidavit of Merit Statute Spurs Litigation and Expense in its
Interpretation and Application, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 279, 279 (2002) (noting that this "stat
ute has been a minefield for plaintiffs' attorneys with disastrous results-with one mis
step, plaintiffs' cases have been quickly disposed of and been barred from re-filing").
101. Brown, supra note 100, at 427; Stroub, supra note 100, at 288.
102. Medeiros v. O'Donnell & Naccarato, Inc., 790 A.2d 969, 973-74 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002).
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not manifested an intent to create a hurdle for the court's subject
matter jurisdiction.
A.

Plain Meaning of the Statute
1.

Section 52-190a Does Not Clearly Implicate the Subject
Matter Jurisdiction of Connecticut Trial Courts

Connecticut requires a clear showing of legislative intent
before a statute is read as creating a hurdle for the court's subject
matter jurisdiction. 103 Though a statute may use mandatory lan
guage (language that compels a certain result),l°4 that language
alone may not always provide the required showing of intent. IOS
Speaking in the context of a statute of limitations, the Connecticut
Supreme Court noted that, "[a]lthough we acknowledge that
mandatory language may be an indication that the legislature in
tended a time requirement to be jurisdictional, such language alone
does not overcome the strong presumption of jurisdiction, nor does
such language alone prove strong legislative intent to create a juris
dictional bar. "106
Facially, this statute provides little indication that dismissal is
required for failure to include the required certificate and opinion.
Section 52-190a(c) states that "[t]he failure to obtain and file the
written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be
grounds for the dismissal of the action."107 The word "shall" can be
either directory or mandatory, depending upon the manner in
which it is used.108 Use of the word "shall" in a statute is
mandatory when "the prescribed mode of action [(here dismissal)]
103. Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 611 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)
(quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651
(Conn. 2001)).
104. See Maitan v. Access Ambulance Co., 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 436, 437 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2007). An example of mandatory language would be "the action shall be
dismissed." /d. This court concluded that the language in the statute, "shall be grounds
for dismissal," was not mandatory and thus allowed for discretionary dismissal. ld.
105. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 611 (quoting Williams, 777 A.2d at 651).
106. Williams, 777 A.2d at 653. The Court further explained the distinction be
tween mandatory language and subject matter jurisdiction-if language is mandatory, it
may be satisfied through waiver or consent, two doctrines anathema to the rules regard
ing subject matter jurisdiction. ld.
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007).
108. LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1, 6 (Conn. 1990); see also BLACK'S, supra
note 75, at 493 (A "directory requirement" is "[a] statutory or contractual instruction to
act in a way that is advisable, but not absolutely essential-in contrast to a mandatory
requirement. A directory requirement is frequently introduced by the word should or,
less frequently, shall (which is more typically a mandatory word).").
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is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished. "109 Language is
directory if "failure to comply with the requirement does not com
promise the purpose of the statute."110 The Supreme Court of Con
necticut applied this test in LeConche v. Elligers, holding that it was
not satisfied. II I The Court began by noting that the purpose of the
statute is to prevent the filing of frivolous lawsuits. lI2 However, the
Court was unable to conclude that dismissing a claim lacking the
required documentation was so vital to the goal of preventing the
filing of frivolous lawsuits that it was "of the essence."l13
Even with the 2005 amendments, the purpose of section 52
190a has remained unchanged. 114 Thus, although the legislature has
added an enforcement provision to section 52-190a,1l5 the statute
still must be examined in light of these authorities. The goal of the
statute can still be achieved even if procedurally deficient claims are
not dismissed-a trial judge can grant leave to amend. If a claim is
baseless, an attorney should be unable to get the required certifi
cate, resulting in the inevitable termination of the litigation. 116
However, a meritorious claim would still be allowed to proceed as
long as leave to amend the complaint was allowed. 117
Moreover, the legislature's use of the term "grounds" in the
statute supports the assertion that dismissal is directory, not
mandatory. The word has been assigned definitions such as "[t]o
provide a basis for (something, e.g., a legal claim or argument)"118
or " [a] point; a reason; support for a cause or action. The basis for
109. LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Var
tuli v. Sotire, 472 A.2d 336, 341 (Conn. 1984)).
110. Angelsea Prods., Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 674
A.2d 1300, 1306 (Conn. 1996).
111. LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6.
112.
113.
114.

[d.

/d.
See Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375 (Conn. Super.

Ct. 2006) (The purpose of the legislation "is to inhibit a plaintiff from bringing an inade
quately investigated cause of action, whether in tort or in contract, claiming negligence
by a health care provider." (quoting Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis
Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795, 802 (Conn. 1997))).
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2005).
116. If an attorney was able to certify a frivolous claim, that would signify a more
fundamental flaw with the statute's relationship to its goal.
117. See Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 726 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2007) (holding that failure to include the required certificate is a curable deficiency); see
also Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 808 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); Donovan v.
Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 613 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
118. BLACK'S, supra note 75, at 723.

2009]

TRAP FOR THE UNWARY

469

taking a step in an action."1l9 This language does not strongly sug
gest that the claim must be dismissed. Instead, it indicates that a
court has a basis for dismissal when a litigant fails to include the
required certificate.
Further, even if the arguments above do not conclusively
demonstrate that dismissal is discretionary, they at least demon
strate that the statute is ambiguous. Given the presumption in
favor of a court having subject matter jurisdiction, a strong showing
of intent is required to deprive a court of such jurisdiction. 120 Due
to its ambiguity, the language in section 52-190a does not provide a
clear showing of the required intent.
In light of these definitions, interpretations, and principles, a
working construction of subsection (c) of the statute emerges. A
court, if it is so inclined, can find a basis for dismissal of a complaint
for failure to include the good faith certificate required under sub
section (a). Under this plain meaning construction, the language of
the statute shows that dismissal is not required. Though the court
may consider dismissing the claim, it is not required to do so.
2.
a.

Addressing Cases That Require Dismissal Under Section
52-190a

Rebutting the presumption in favor of a court's subject matter
jurisdiction

In Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, the court makes a
strong argument that dismissal is required for all procedurally de
fective complaints. l2l The court begins by stating that all "com
plaints . . . shall have a written opinion of a medical provider
attached or be subject to dismissal."122 Noting that the amendments
to section 52-190a "specifically limit" the power of a court to hear
medical malpractice cases, the court held that it is barred from
hearing those cases that are not commenced with the required writ
ten opinion.1 23 As a result, "failure to attach the required opinion
implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction."124
119.
120.
Rights &
121.
2006).
122.
123.
124.

BALLENTINE'S, supra note 75, at 538.
Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 611 (quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human
Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651 (Conn. 2001)).
Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375 (Conn. Super. Ct.

[d. at 376 (emphasis in original).
[d.
[d.
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This textual argument is very strong. The court recognizes the
mandatory language in subsection (c) that all complaints must con
tain the required certificate and written opinion. Since these must
be attached to the complaint, certainly a colorable argument can be
made that the court lacks power to hear cases where they are not
attached. However, this argument is not persuasive.
A strong showing of intent is required to demonstrate the crea
tion of a hurdle for the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 125 Al
though the court correctly observed that the statute clearly requires
all complaints to contain the documentation required by subsection
(a), it is not so clear that dismissal is mandated for those com
plaints. Since the goals of the statute could still be served if these
complaints are amended, dismissal is not essential to those goals.
The reasoning of other courts has been more problematic. In
Peloso v. Walgreen Eastern Co., Inc., the court stated that since
"'[d]ismissal' refers to the action taken when a court lacks jurisdic
tion,"126 the required opinion and certificate were "an absolute
prerequisite for the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and ... the
court does not have discretion in its exercise."127 This approach is
faulty for two reasons.
First, it overlooks the fact that the term "shall be grounds" is
used in the statute. Though a statute that stated, "failure to include
the required certificate must result in dismissal of the claim"128
would clearly create a jurisdictional hurdle, this statute is far less
clear. The court needed to analyze the term "shall be grounds" to
arrive at this conclusion. It did not do so,129
Second, use of the term "dismissal" in a statute does not, in
and of itself, create a jurisdictional barrier. In reaching the conclu
sion that the court must dismiss all deficient complaints, the court in
Peloso stated that, as a matter of interpretation, if a statutory term
is a legal term of art, it should be construed in accordance with its
legal definition.13° As a result, the court concluded that since dis
missal occurs when a court does not have jurisdiction, "[t]he weight
125. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
126. Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 841 n.9 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2007).
127. Id.
128. See Santorso v. Bristol Hasp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 726 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2007) (strongly implying that if the statute stated that dismissal was mandatory for a
deficient complaint, it would be more likely that the statute implicated the court's sub
ject matter jurisdiction).
129. Peloso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 841 n.9.
130. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1 (2007)).
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of authority ... holds that the submission of an opinion of a similar
health care provider is an absolute prerequisite for the court's sub
ject matter jurisdiction, and ... the court does not have discretion
in its exercise. "131
This reasoning is flawed. If a statute stated, for example, that
as a result of a pleading deficiency "the court may dismiss the
claim," it would be difficult to argue that dismissal was mandatory.
A judge clearly would have discretion; otherwise, the word "may"
would be given the same definition as the word "must." This would
be highly problematic as the two terms have separate and distinct
meanings. Similarly, the mere fact that the legislature used the
word "dismissal" in section 52-190a(c) does not create a jurisdic
tional threshold in and of itself.B2 The court needed to interpret
the rest of the statute to arrive at that conclusion; yet, it did not.
Other cases finding that dismissal is mandatory have done so in
a conclusory manner.!33 For example, in Landry v. Zborowski, the
court stated that "[a]n application of the commonly approved usage
of the English language to this statute surely compels the conclu
sion that [subsection (c)] requires dismissal of the case if plaintiff
did not obtain and file any opinion at all. "134 The court did not
engage in any meaningful statutory construction.B 5 Similarly, in
Kirkpatrick v. New Britain General Hospital, the court stated that
since it was clear that the plaintiff did not obtain the required writ
ten opinion, the "plain and specific language of the statute" man
131.
132.

Id.
See Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645,

653 (Conn. 2001) (holding that use of mandatory language alone is insufficient to create
a jurisdictional hurdle). If even the use of mandatory language does not overcome the
strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction, surely the use of the word "dismissal" does
not either. This is especially true in light of the somewhat ambiguous wording of the
statute. Since the statute says "shall be grounds for dismissal" instead of "must be
dismissed" the language should not be read as evidence of the required legislative in
tent. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007).
133. See Landry v. Zborowski, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007),
vacated in part by Landry v. Zborowski, No. CV076000211S, 2007 WL 4105519 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2007); Kirkpatrick v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 519
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
134. Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. at 57.
135. [d. The court did not analyze the statute aside from this naked conclusion.
However, the court then engaged in statutory construction in the context of an insuffi
ciently detailed opinion. Id. at 58. The court concluded that dismissal is mandatory for
an insufficiently detailed opinion because subsection (c) calls for the written opinion
"required by subsection (a)." Id. Since subsection (a) requires a detailed opinion, fail
ure to include a sufficiently detailed opinion results in mandatory dismissal. Id.
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dated dismissal. 136 However, the court did not break down the
statute in reaching this conc1usion.137
b.

Internal inconsistencies in cases reading section 52-190a as
creating a barrier to subject matter jurisdiction

Many of the courts that have concluded that attachment of the
required documentation is a hurdle for the court's subject matter
jurisdiction have not been internally consistent. 138 For example, in
Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Medicine, the court found that "[t]he
statutory language, and the legislative intent indicate that the re
quirement of obtaining and filing an opinion was intended as a ju
risdictional hurdle for medical malpractice actions. "139 However,
the court held that an insufficient opinion is not grounds for dismis
sal of the action.140
While it seems like a prudent approach to wait until discovery
has occurred before determining whether a written opinion is suffi
cient,141 this approach is inconsistent with the view that a certificate
and opinion are a threshold jurisdictional requirement. 142 Subsec
tion (c) states that "[ t ]he failure to obtain and file the written opin
ion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the
dismissal of the action."143 Subsection (a) requires "a written and
136. Kirkpatrick, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 520. This naked assertion is all the court
gave. Id. The court stated that because the plaintiff did not have the written opinion
prior to filing his complaint, "this would trigger subsection (c) of the statute so that the
court would be compelled to dismiss the complaint." Id. at 519. Although the plaintiff
argued that there would be no prejudice to the defendant if amendment was allowed,
the court, despite agreeing, held that it was bound by the plain and clear statutory
language. Id. at 520.
137. Id.; see also Grammond v. Greenwich Hosp., No. FSTCY065000533, 2006
WL 2536596, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2006) (stating that "[t]he plain language of
the statute requires that this court dismiss the action unless the plaintiff has submitted a
written opinion of a health care provider" without engaging in statutory construction).
138. See, e.g., Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2006). But see Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56 (holding that dismissal is
mandatory for an insufficiently detailed opinion because subsection (c) requires the
opinion "required by subsection (a)"-a detailed opinion).
139. Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 225.
140. Id.
141. This is the majority approach. See Yicenzi v. Abbott Terrace Health Ctr.,
Inc., 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 363, 364-65 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (noting that a majority of
the Connecticut trial courts that have decided this issue have held that the sufficiency of
the written opinion included with the good faith certificate is not tested with a motion
to dismiss).
142. See Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. at 57.
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007) (emphasis added). For the text of
subsection (a), see supra text accompanying note 16.
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signed opinion of a similar health care provider ... that there ap
pears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed
basis for the formation of such opinion."144 Thus, subsection (a)
does not just require a written opinion, it requires a detailed opin
ion. If subsection (c) forms a jurisdictional hurdle, it is not satisfied
merely by inclusion of a written opinion-the opinion must be suffi
ciently detailed. Courts are understandably reluctant to dismiss
cases at this stage. However, if subsection (c) forms a jurisdictional
hurdle, then all claims containing opinions of insufficient detail
must be dismissed because they fail to meet the requirements of
subsection (a). If the opinion and written certificate required by
subsection (a) are a prerequisite for the court's subject matter juris
diction, then the court lacks the discretion to state that insuffi
ciently detailed complaints should not be dismissed.
The court in Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc. pointed out
the absurdities that could result from allowing the sufficiency of the
written opinion of a similar medical professional to be challenged
via a motion to dismiss:
[I]f trial judges were required to treat motions to dismiss in the
§ 52-190a context as raising subject matter jurisdiction[,] ... to
what talisman do trial judges turn to decide whether in a particular
case sufficient detail has been provided to show a basis for the
malpractice action? Do we hold evidentiary hearings to decide

the question? Do we just hear oral argument? All of this does
not have the ring of defining an issue that should be decided on
the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. The legislature must be
presumed to have intended sensible results from the application
of its legislation. 145
As a result, the court concluded that subsection (c) does not
implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 146 Instead, the
court concluded that the legislative language was meant to set up a
"procedural rule requiring plaintiffs to provide mandatory informa
tion or discovery at the inception of litigation without the need for
the defendant to move for such information."147 Consequently, the
court found that the sanction of a non-suit provides a possible rem

144. [d. § 52-190a(a).
145. Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2007) (emphasis added).
146.
147.

[d.
/d. at 402.
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edy, as that is one of the sanctions provided for under Connecticut's
discovery rules. 148
This is the most logical approach. First, it allows a court to
determine when a claim should be dismissed. Second, it avoids the
inconsistency present in Andrikis 149 by providing that the standard
for determining whether a case should be dismissed is the same re
gardless of whether the motion to dismiss is filed for failing to in
clude the required opinion or for including an insufficiently detailed
OpInIOn.
B.

Legislative Intent

When statutory language is unclear and ambiguous on its face,
the court must determine the legislative intent and give it effect.1 50
With section 52-190a, the Connecticut legislature did not intend to
mandate dismissal of all deficient complaints. Instead, it intended
failure to include the required documentation to constitute a cur
able defect.
1.

Early Drafts of the Statute

As originally introduced, the enforcement clause of the bill
stated that failure to file the written opinion "shall be grounds for
immediate dismissal."151 The version that was ultimately enacted
reads: "The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required
by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of
the action."152 The question becomes whether "immediate" was re
moved for a reason.
The legislative history contains no explanation why the Judi
ciary Committee removed this word. This begs the question-was
the word removed because it made an undesirable contribution to
the statute? A court presented with a challenge to its subject mat
ter jurisdiction must resolve the challenge before proceeding to any
trial on the merits; thus, use of the term "immediate" in the original
version of the statute suggests that a court must decide whether or
148. Id.
149. Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2006).
150. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2007). This rule of statutory construction is in line
with the approach of most other states. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCfION 46:01 (7th ed. 2007).
151. S. 1052,2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005) (emphasis added); supra
Part LB.
152. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a(c).
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not to dismiss the complaint before moving on to the merits of the
case. 153 In other words, it appears that the word created a prerequi
site for the court's subject matter jurisdiction. As previously stated,
the language as amended does not as clearly implicate the court's
subject matter jurisdiction.1 54 If the legislature wanted to create a
hurdle for the court's subject matter jurisdiction, enacting the stat
ute as introduced would have accomplished that goal. This is espe
cially true in light of the strong presumption in favor of a court
having subject matter jurisdiction, a rule about which the legislature
is presumed to be aware.1 55 Consequently, if it wanted to make a
hurdle for the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it needed to do
more.
This point is reinforced after consideration of an early draft of
subsection (a) of the amendment. Regarding the consequences of
filing a good faith certificate in bad faith, the early version of sub
section (a) stated in part that:
If the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that

such certificate was not made in good faith and that no justiciable
issue was presented against a health care provider that fully co
operated in providing informal discovery, the court upon motion
or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the person who
signed such certificate or a represented party, or both, an appro
priate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, in
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may also submit
the matter to the appropriate authority for disciplinary review of
the attorney if the claimant's attorney submitted the certificate or
the action shall be subject to immediate dismissal pursuant to sub
section [(d)] of this section. 156

Though this language was not ultimately enacted, it shows that
the legislature clearly knew how to make dismissal mandatory. The
language states that if the matter is not submitted for disciplinary
review, the action must be dismissed. This is different from the lan
153. S. 1052; see also Esposito v. Specyalski, 844 A.2d 211, 218 (Conn. 2004) (ex
plaining that a court must dismiss a case over which it cannot exercise subject matter
jurisdiction).
154. See supra Part II.A.I.
155. Considine v. City of Waterbury, 905 A.2d 70, 81 (Conn. 2006) ("[T]he legis
lature is presumed to be aware of prior judicial decisions involving common-law rules."
(quoting Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 865 A.2d 1163, 1175 n.21 (Conn.
2005))).
156. S. 1052 (emphasis added).
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guage adopted in subsection (c), which is more discretionary in na
ture. 157 If the legislature intended dismissal to be mandatory in
subsection (c), it could have used the forceful language necessary to
make it so. Its decision not to do so is indicative of legislative in
tent, and it should be given effect.158
2.

Consideration of Subsection (c) in Light of Other
Subsections

The penalties for filing a certificate in bad faith indicate that
the legislature never intended for the sufficiency of the complaint to
be measured until after discovery.159 The statute states that the
court cannot determine whether the certificate was filed in good
faith until after the completion of discovery.16o
If subsection (c) creates a jurisdictional hurdle, then, as stated
above, the plaintiff must not merely submit a written opinion. In
stead, the plaintiff must submit the opinion "required by subsection
(a),"161 which requires a detailed opinion.1 62 However, the legisla
ture has clearly indicated that an attorney's good faith in submitting
a certificate is not to be measured until after discovery.1 63 Since an
attorney's good faith in certifying a complaint depends on the com
157.
158.

See supra Part II.A.I.
See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (" '[W)here Congress

includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'" (alteration in the original) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). This prin
ciple extends to legislative history. When the Connecticut legislature considered
mandatory language and then rejected it, it should be presumed to have acted inten
tionally and purposely. See United States v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 369 F. Supp. 1289,
1292 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (noting that legislative intent "may be gleaned from several fac
tors, including ... successive drafts ... of the legislation"), rev'd on other grounds by
United States v. Union Oil. Co. of Cal., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977).
159. See Vicenzi v. Abbott Terrace Health Ctr., Inc., No. CV075004413S, 2007
WL 3318198, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 29,2007) (noting that a majority of the Con
necticut trial courts that have decided this issue have held that the sufficiency of the
written opinion included with the good faith certificate is not tested with a motion to
dismiss).
160. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(a) (2007). The statute explicitly provides:
If the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that such certificate
was not made in good faith and that no justiciable issue was presented ... the
court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the person
who signed such certificate or a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction ....
Id.

161. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c); see supra text accompanying notes 143-144.
162. See id. § 52-190a(a).
163.

Id.
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plaint's sufficiency, which can only be measured through discovery,
the legislature could not have intended for the overall sufficiency of
the opinion to be measured until discovery had taken place. As a
result, if a sufficient opinion is not a jurisdictional hurdle under this
statute, then failure to include one is not either. Rather, it is a de
fect that can be remedied. Given the language used in subsection
(c), it would be absurd to assume that the legislature intended ob
taining and filing the opinion to be a jurisdictional hurdle, but not
obtaining and filing the detailed opinion required by subsection (a).
Such an intent does not appear on the face of the statute, nor does
it appear in the legislative history.
3.

The Status of LeConche v. Elligers

If the legislature wanted to unambiguously make clear that the

required certificate was a jurisdictional hurdle, it could have stated
that LeConche v. Elligers is overruled. LeConche was a landmark
case that stated that a certificate of good faith is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite. l64 Yet, nowhere in the statute does the legislature
state that section 52-190a overrules LeConche. Moreover, the case
is not even mentioned in the legislative history.1 65
The mere inclusion of subsection (c) does not provide evidence
of the legislature's intent to overrule LeConche. The legislature
should be aware 166 of the strong presumption of subject matter ju
risdiction.1 67 This presumption becomes stronger given that "tradi
tionally the Superior Court has had subject matter jurisdiction of a
common law medical malpractice action."168 In light of this, the
164. LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1990).
165. Cf 29 U.S.c. § 794 (2000), which was amended in 1988 specifically to over
rule the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). S.
REP. No. 100-64, at 2 (1987), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 3-4 (stating that the
amendment "was introduced on February 19, 1987, to overturn the Supreme Court's
1984 decision in Grove City College v. Bell, ... and to restore the effectiveness and
vitality of the four major civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination in federally
assisted programs." (footnote omitted)).
166. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text. While it is undoubtedly
true that a statute rarely explicitly overrules a case, Connecticut's strong presumption in
favor of jurisdiction requires the legislature to provide clear, unambiguous intent to
curtail that jurisdiction. It is hard to imagine clearer intent than for the legislature to
say "LeConche v. ElUgers is hereby overruled" at least somewhere in the legislative
history.
167. Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 611 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)
(quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651
(Conn. 2001)).
168. [d. at 611 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 5).
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legislature must show a clear intent that a jurisdictional threshold
has been created. The legislature failed to do so here.
Though in Doe v. Priority Care, Inc. the court concluded that
the legislature intended to make changes to the regime set up by
LeConche,169 the court noted that this does not necessarily mean
that it intended to overrule that case's central holdingPO In reach
ing this conclusion, the court examined how earlier courts had used
legislative history in their holdings. l7l The court noted that while
one representative recognized that the 2005 amendment to section
52-190a "makes it much more difficult to bring a medical malprac
tice action in court,"l72 other legislators have taken different views.
For example, one legislator noted that the purpose of the amend
ment was to focus on the issues in the case through use of an inde
pendent third party.173 This purpose is still served if leave to amend
a procedurally deficient complaint is granted. 174
It is also important to note that statements of legislators during
the legislative process are not always indications of legislative in
tent. Generally, "the statements and opinions of legislators uttered
in a legislature are not appropriate sources of information from
which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed
by such body."175 Although the legislative history of the 2005
amendments to section 52-190a contains a statement from Senator
McDonald stating that "[t]he failure to attach such an opinion
would require the court to dismiss the case,"176 this is not the best
way to divine the legislative intent. The intent of this particular
legislator-who did not draft this statute-is not necessarily the
same as the intent of the legislature as a whole. This is especially

169. Doe v. Priority Care, Inc., 933 A.2d 755, 759 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007).
170. Id. at 755.
171. Priority Care, Inc., 933 A.2d at 759 (examining the holdings of Andrikis v.
Phoenix Internal Medicine, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) and Ouellette
v. Brook Hollow Health Care Center, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 863 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)).
172. Id. (quoting Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 225).
173. Id.
174. A complaint amended to include the required certificate can still be used to
identify actionable conduct. The amendment will not eviscerate this purpose of the
statute.
175. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 89 (2001) (citing FfC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643,650 (1931)). "It is true, at least generally, that statements made in debate cannot
be used as aids to the construction of a statute." /d.
176. Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 841 n.9 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2007).
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true given that the language of the statute does not inevitably lead
to the conclusion reached by Senator McDonald. 177
III.

CONNECTICUT COURTS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO
DISMISS ALL PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT COMPLAINTS
UNDER SECTION 52-190a

This Part explores why Connecticut trial courts should not be
obligated to dismiss all complaints lacking the required documenta
tion. First, this Part analyzes issues of public policy. The first Sec
tion of this Part examines Connecticut's goal of ensuring that all
cases are resolved on their merits. The next Section explores the
negative implications of an interpretation of section 52-190a that
mandates dismissal of all procedurally deficient complaints. This
includes discussion of both the principle of access to justice and the
goals of the tort system. Lastly, this Part explores common issues
surrounding statutes similar to section 52-190a.
A.

Public Policy
1.

Ensuring that Cases are Resolved on their Merits

As a matter of policy, section 52-190a should not be inter
preted as implicating a court's subject matter jurisdiction. In Con
necticut, there is
a "policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dis
pute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in
court ... The design of the rules of practice is both to facilitate
business and to advance justice ... Our practice does not favor
the termination of proceedings without a determination of the
merits of the controversy where that can be brought about with
due regard to necessary rules of procedure."178

Dismissal of claims at the pleading stage allows potentially
meritorious claims to be decided on procedural grounds. Santorso
v. Bristol Hospital illustrates this point wellY9 It seems fairly clear
that Lawrence Santorso was injured because of negligence on the
part of the hospital. Notes were placed in his file that additional
177. See supra Part II.A.1.
178. Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 807 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (quot
ing Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 893 A.2d 371, 387 (Conn. 2006) (omissions in
original».
179. Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 724 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2007).
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tests were needed; yet, none were performed. 180 When Santorso
filed his complaint, he failed to include the required certificate and
written opinion. 181 If the court had concluded that section 52-190a
mandated dismissal of all deficient complaints, his claim would have
been dismissed, and he would have been denied his day in court. 182
Such a dismissal would fly in the face of Connecticut's settled policy
of deciding cases on their merits.I83 Due regard for the rules of
procedure does not mandate dismissal. Instead, leave to amend
should be granted.
No legitimate policy aims would be served by the dismissal of
claims similar to Lawrence Santorso's.184 Section 52-190a was en
acted to prevent the filing of frivolous claims. 18s However, dis
missal of claims at the pleading stage does not accomplish this goal.
It is certainly possible to have a viable claim yet not to be aware
that additional documentation is required. 186 This is especially true
given that the statute applies to pro se litigants as well as to those
who are represented by counsel and also does not include a demand
requirement. Allowing a plaintiff to amend his or her complaint
does not conflict with the goals of the statute.
2.

Any Gains from a Rigid Interpretation of Section 52
190a Are Outweighed by Negative Policy
Implications

Certainly, dismissing all deficient complaints would help pre
vent lawyerly gamesmanship. This would create a hard and fast
rule with no exceptions. A litigant who filed a deficient complaint
would be unable to get more time to investigate his or her claim
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 725.
183. Greer, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 807 (quoting Evans, 893 A.2d at 387).
184. Although conservation of judicial resources is certainly a valid policy goal,
Cavaliere v. Olmsted, 909 A.2d 52, 55 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (noting the policy of con
serving judicial resources), allowing Santorso to amend his complaint does little to tax
the system. Santorso was ordered to amend his complaint "to include the good faith
certificate and the opinion of a health care professional similar to each defendant within
a period of thirty days." Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 726. Such an action does not
unduly burden the judicial system. Moreover, any drain on the resources of the court
that might be relieved by mandating dismissal is outweighed by other negative policy
implications.
185. Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795,
802 (Conn. 1997).
186. See Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 724 (stating that Santorso, by his own
admission, failed to file the required certificate and written opinion).
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and amend later if necessary. That rule would amount to a value
judgment-it is better to dismiss potentially legitimate claims so as
to prevent potentially frivolous claims from proceeding. However,
any gain that might. stem from such a rule would be offset by its
consequences because it would require our legal system to turn a
blind eye to principles like access to justice and the goals of the tort
system.

a.

Access to justice

The courts have traditionally been the place where harmed in
dividuals can seek redress. 187 However, procedural booby-traps
such as section 52-190a form a barrier to the court system. 188 The
right to sue for medical malpractice is "a common-law right given to
citizens to redress their grievances in the only practical forum avail
able; namely, the courts. Before that right is circumscribed it must
be absolutely clear that the legislature intended to curtail its exer
cise."189 Connecticut is understandably reluctant to take the right
to seek redress away from its citizens.19o However, interpreting the
certificate of good faith and written opinion as jurisdictional has the
very effect of forming a barrier to citizens seeking redress for medi
cal negligence in Connecticut courts.
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Zeier v.
Zimmer, Inc. struck down Oklahoma's affidavit of merit statute
both as "an unconstitutional monetary barrier" to court access and
as an "unconstitutional special law."191 The court found that the
"statutorily created requirement for the payment of professional
services as a prerequisite to the filing of a ... medical malpractice
[claim] violates the court access provisions guaranteed by art. 2,
[section] 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution."l92 That constitutional
provision provides that "[t]he courts of justice of the State shall be
open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for
every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation;
and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, de
187. See Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 11 (Conn. 1975) (noting that "the right
of redress for injury is constitutional in its nature"). This right is reflected in the open
courts provision of the Connecticut Constitution. CONN. CaNsT. art. 1, § 10. Almost all
(if not all) other states contain a similar provision. See, e.g., OKLA. CaNsT. art. 2, § 6.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 191-196.
189. Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401-02 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2007).
190. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
191. Zeier v. Zimmer Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 862 (Okla. 2006).
192. ld. at 869.
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lay, or prejudice."193 The court noted that out of all possible liti
gants, medical malpractice plaintiffs are singled out and forced to
procure an expert opinion before there is any adjudication of their
rights. 194 The affidavit costs anywhere between five hundred and
five thousand dollars. 195 Because of this, the court held that since
the doors to the courthouse are closed to those who are financially
unable to procure an affidavit, the statute creates an unconstitu
tional monetary barrier. l96
Article 1, section 10 of the Connecticut Constitution contains a
virtually identical provision to that of Oklahoma. 197 As a result, it
certainly is arguable that section 52-190a violates Article 1, section
10 of the Connecticut Constitution as well by requiring plaintiffs to
pay for a medical opinion. However, even if this statute does not
violate the Connecticut Constitution, it still is problematic. As the
costs of litigation have risen, malpractice attorneys have become
increasingly selective about the cases they take on. 198 Further, be
cause many injuries are worth less than the costs of litigating with a
malpractice attorney, many injured parties seek relief by litigating
pro se. Statutes like section 52-190a make it virtually impossible for
a pro se litigant to have her case resolved on the merits. Though "it
is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of
pro se litigants,"199 the statute contains no exception for them.20o
As a result, if the certificate is interpreted as a prerequisite to sub
ject matter jurisdiction, many litigants will be denied access to jus
tice because of this pleading requirement.

193. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 6.
194. Zeier, 152 P.3d at 872-73.
195. Id. at 873.
196.

[d.

197. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.").
198. See Christopher S. Kozak, A Review of Federal Malpractice Tort Reform Al
ternatives, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 599, 599 n.l (1995) (noting the increased costs of
filing a medical malpractice suit) ..
199. Traylor v. Awwa, No. 5001159, 2007 WL 1748189, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
June 1, 2007) (quoting Solomon v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd., 859 A.2d 932, 938
(Conn. App. 2004)).
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a (2007).
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The goals of the tort system

The two main goals of the tort system are compensation for
victims and deterrence of negligent behavior. 201 Interpretation of
section 52-190a as creating a hurdle for the court's subject matter
jurisdiction works against these two goals. 202
Requiring dismissal for deficient complaints denies compensa
tion to victims as a result of a procedural technicality, not on the
merits of their cases.203 Litigants who lack the resources to hire
effective counselor who choose to proceed pro se risk dismissal if
they are not aware of section 52-190a. Overall, statutes like this
"prevent meritorious medical malpractice actions from being
filed,"204 either because the plaintiff is unaware of the requirement
or because they require extensive pre-trial discovery to get the facts
needed for an expert to write an opinion. 20s Thus, the injured par
ties must overcome a significant barrier when seeking compensa
tion for their injuries.
If failure to include the written opinion and good faith certifi
cate requires dismissal, then the Connecticut legislature has re
moved a deterrent to negligent behavior. The primary mechanism
for holding doctors liable for professional negligence is the medical
malpractice system. 206 However, if meritorious claims are dis
missed on procedural grounds, then negligent doctors will not be
identified. Identification of both negligent behavior and negligent
doctors is necessary to enhance quality of patient care. 207 Medical
malpractice suits serve an important function: they place doctors on
201. Adam J. Winters, Where There's Smoke, Is There Fire? An Empirical Analy
sis of the Tort Crisis in Illinois, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2007) ("Most scholars
will agree that the tort system has two primary goals: '(1) to compensate persons who
are injured through the negligence of others and (2) to deter future negligent behavior,'
both in the specific defendant and in others. " (citation omitted)).
202. A contrary interpretation would allow amendment of procedurally defective
complaints. Thus, potentially meritorious claims would be allowed to proceed to trial.
If truly meritorious, the plaintiff would prevail and the defendant would be held liable,
thus satisfying the two goals of the tort system. Consequently, if a claim is brought that
lacks the statutorily required documentation, a judge should order the claim amended.
If the plaintiff is unable to obtain certification, then the claim is frivolous and should be
dismissed.
203. Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 869 (Okla. 2006).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process:
Moving From Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice
Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2006) ("The medical malpractice sys
tem is one of the major vehicles of accountability for medical errors.").
207. Id. at 1182.
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notice that certain conduct is actionable, and remind doctors that
the threat of suit is always present.
Any harm caused by allowing amendment of deficient com
plaints is de minimis when compared to the gains created by al
lowing claims to be resolved on their merits. The public interest in
allowing litigants to have their day in court supersedes any ineffi
ciency and potential for gamesmanship. Ensuring that litigants
have access to justice furthers the goals of the tort system by al
lowing cases to be resolved on their merits and by deterring negli
gent behavior.
B.

The Approaches of Other States

Many statutes address what states perceive as a medical mal
practice crisis.208 Some statutes place caps on damages; others re
quire presentation of a claim to a review board; and still others
place caps on malpractice insurance. 209 Many states have also
taken approaches similar to Connecticut's by requiring certificates
of good faith and affidavits.210 However, unlike section 52-190a,
some of these statutes are more artfully drawn and protect the in
terests of all parties. 211 They illustrate that similar language can be
interpreted as this Note suggests212 and show the dangers of a con
trary interpretation. 213
1.

Minnesota

Minnesota's affidavit of merit statute requires the submission
of two affidavits.214 First, the plaintiff'S attorney must draft an affi
davit of expert review stating that
[t]he facts of the case have been reviewed by the plaintiff's attor
ney with an expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable ex
pectation that the expert's opinions could be admissible at trial
and that, in the opinion of this expert, one or more defendants
208. See supra note 95.
209. JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACfICE IN A NUTSHELL
320-22 (2d ed. 1986).
210. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2003), invalidated by Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2002); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000).
211. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.682.
212. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622.
213. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27.
214. MINN. STAT. § 145.682.
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deviated from the applicable standard of care and by that action
caused injury to the plaintiff. 215
However, if the statute of limitations made it unreasonable to
acquire the affidavit before filing suit, the plaintiff has ninety days
from the date of service of the summons and complaint to serve the
affidavit on the defendant or the defendant's counsel.216 The sec
ond affidavit is an identification of the experts who will be called to
testify, what they will say, and a summation of how they arrived at
that conclusion. 217
Subdivision 6 of the statute addresses the penalties for non
compliance. 218 It states that failure to submit the first affidavit
"within 60 days after demand for the affidavit results, upon motion,
in mandatory dismissal with prejudice of each cause of action as to
which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie
case."219 Similarly, if the plaintiff fails to file the second affidavit,
the defendant can move for dismissal of all causes of action requir
ing expert testimony to state a claim.220 However, the operation of
this provision is limited by clause (c), which states that if the second
affidavit is submitted but is noncompliant due to "deficiencies in
the affidavit," the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice as
long as
(1) the motion to dismiss the action identifies the claimed defi
ciencies in the affidavit or answers to interrogatories; (2) the time
for hearing the motion is at least 45 days from the date of service
of the motion; and (3) before the hearing on the motion, the

plaintiff does not serve upon the defendant an amended affidavit
or answers to interrogatories that correct the claimed
deficiencies. 221
Connecticut trial courts should be mindful of the safeguards
contained in the Minnesota statute. Under that statute, there is lit
tle risk of creating a trap for the unwary because failure to submit
the first affidavit does not result in dismissal until sixty days have
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

§ 145.682(3)(a).
§ 145.682(3)(b).
§ 145.682(4)(a).
§ 145.682(6).
§ 145.682(6)(a).
§ 145.682(6)(b).
§ 145.682(6)(c). The danger posed by section 52-190a is that an unsophis

221.
ticated, honestly injured litigant filing a medical malpractice action may be unaware of
the statute. A demand requirement quells this danger, as dismissal cannot occur until
the plaintiff has at least been made aware of this requirement.
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passed since the demand. 222 This statute ensures that the plaintiff is
aware of the affidavit requirement. Although there have been con
troversies surrounding the interpretation of the statute,223 the stat
ute is effective at permitting meritorious yet procedurally deficient
claims to proceed to trial. This fact alone demonstrates the stat
ute's superiority to Connecticut's statute when it is interpreted as
requiring certification as a prerequisite to subject matter
jurisdiction.224
2.

Illinois

Illinois's certificate of merit statute, before it was found uncon
stitutional, contained language identical to that used in Connecti
cut.225 The statute stated that "the failure [of the plaintiff] to file a
certificate required by this Section shall be grounds for dismissal
under Section 2-619."226 In holding that this language does not
mandate dismissal with prejudice for failure to include the required
affidavit, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that to hold conversely
"would be a triumph of form over substance. It would elevate a
pleading requirement designed to reduce frivolous lawsuits into a
substantive defense forever barring plaintiffs who initially fail to
comply with its terms."227
In concluding, the court noted that the trial court has the dis
cretion to grant leave to amend the complaint. 228 This approach
strikes the balance toward which Connecticut should strive. Instead
of creating a hard and fast rule, the Illinois legislature gave Illinois
trial courts the discretion to determine whether a complaint should

222. Id. § 145.682(6).
223. See generally Jason Leo, Torts-Medical Malpractice: The Legislature's At
tempt to Prevent Cases Without Merit Denies Valid Claims, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1399, 1406 (2000).
224. The fact that Minnesota included a demand requirement is telling. Though
they have specified a harsh remedy, it will not be imposed until the plaintiff is at least
aware of the statutory requirements. Although the Connecticut courts would be unable
to read a demand requirement into the statute, allowing amendment of procedurally
deficient complaints would have the same effect. It would ensure that no claims are
dismissed at least until the plaintiff is aware that documentation is needed.
225. 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2003), invalidated by Best V. Taylor
Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
226. Id.
227. McCasUe V. Sheinkop, 520 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ill. 1988).
228. Id.
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be dismissed,229 or whether leave to amend should be granted. 23o
Connecticut trial courts should be given the same discretion.
3.

New Jersey

The New Jersey affidavit of merit statute has caused a great
deal of confusion and has resulted in the dismissal of many merito
rious c1aims. 231 Interpreting Connecticut's statute in the same man
ner that the New Jersey trial courts have interpreted New Jersey's
will result in similar problems. Rather than going down this road,
Connecticut courts should learn from the problems New Jersey
courts confronted in interpreting the statute of their state.
The New Jersey statute reads:
In any action for damages ... resulting from an alleged act of

malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession
or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the
date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant,
provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate li
censed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the
care, skill, or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment,
practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside
acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment
practices. The court may grant no more than one additional pe
riod, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this
section, upon a finding of good cause. 232
If a plaintiff fails to provide. the required documentation, "it shall
be deemed a failure to state a cause of action. "233
Critics argued that although this statute was intended to iden
tify and dismiss frivolous malpractice cases, it "has evolved into a
deathtrap for the unwary and has resulted in a tidal wave of contra
dictory decisions by the trial and appellate courtS."234 New Jersey
courts have strictly construed the statutory requirements, dismissing
229. Illinois courts also can choose whether the claim should be dismissed with
prejudice. Id.
230. Id.
231. Brown, supra note 100, at 427 (discussing the dismissal of valid claims).
232. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000).
233. /d. § 2A:53A-29. This circumstance results in the dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances." Cornblatt v. Barow,
708 A.2d 401, 415 (N.J. 1998).
234. Brown, supra note 100, at 427; see also Stroub, supra note 100, at 279 (noting
that this statute has operated as a protocol minefield). Stroub also enumerates a num
ber of cases that have been dismissed as a result of "technical non-compliance." Stroub,
supra note 100, at 302-03.
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complaints for the slightest deficiencies in the affidavit of merit. 235
For example, in Medeiros v. O'Donnell & Naccarato, Inc., the trial
court dismissed the case with prejudice because the affidavit re
ferred to the engineering firm as the "defendant," rather than using
its name, as the statute prescribed. 236 Though the Appellate Divi
sion of the Superior Court reversed using the doctrine of substantial
compliance,237 this is still problematic.
Dismissal of potentially meritorious claims for the slightest
procedural defects is bad policy.238 It inhibits a citizen's access to
justice and undermines the goals of the tort system. A court should
not have to resort to the substantial compliance doctrine to save
claims such as these. Furthermore, it is certainly possible, if not
likely, that similarly meritorious cases have been dismissed and
were not revived by substantial compliance. 239 Likewise it is impos
sible to determine "how many defendants have used the affidavit of
merit statute as a shield and a sword, being relieved from potential
liability by motioning to dismiss cases against them based on that
technical noncompliance. "240 Interpreting Connecticut's certificate
of merit statute liberally will allow the trial courts to bypass these
issues. As was seen in New Jersey,241 such an interpretation is per
fectly valid.
CONCLUSION

Connecticut trial courts have borne the brunt of the Connecti
cut legislature's sloppy drafting. In the wake of the 2005 amend
ments to section 52-190a, Connecticut trial courts are divided.
Since further legislative guidance will likely not be forthcoming, the
courts will be forced to interpret the language as it currently is writ
ten. The language and legislative history show that the Connecticut
legislature intended for courts to adopt a liberal interpretation of
this statute, giving judges discretion to order amendment of defi
cient claims. However, this is only part of the story. Examination
of public policy shows that a rigid interpretation of section 52-190a
is imprudent.
235. See Medeiros v. O'Donnell & Naccarato, Inc., 790 A.2d 969, 970 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002).
236. Id. at 97l.
237. Id. at 973-74.
238. See Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 807 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)
(quoting Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 893 A.2d 371, 387 (Conn. 2006)).
239. Stroub, supra note 100, at 302-03.
240. Id. at 303.
241. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000).

2009]

TRAP FOR THE UNWARY

489

Society loses when claims are decided on procedural grounds
and litigants are denied their day in court. Our society values ac
cess to the courts. In fact, there are constitutional provisions in
most states requiring it. Yet, a rigid interpretation of section 52
190a would eviscerate this cherished right. The costs of obtaining
an opinion from a medical professional make it exceedingly difficult
for low-income plaintiffs to have their cases decided on the merits.
Further, the rising costs of medical malpractice lawsuits make attor
neys reluctant to accept low-value claims. This forces many injured
parties to litigate pro se, ignorant of the rules, and without an attor
ney to guide them through what has been described as a procedural
minefield. 242 If Connecticut courts are serious about ensuring that
disputes are decided on their merits and that all individuals have
access to the courts, a liberal interpretation of section 52-190a
should be adopted.
Connecticut would be wise to learn from the experiences of
other states. New Jersey's affidavit of merit statute has sparked a
great deal of litigation and has resulted in the dismissal of many
claims. Eventually, the New Jersey courts had to adopt the substan
tial compliance doctrine to save meritorious complaints and amelio
rate the havoc this statute was wreaking on their medical
malpractice system.
While not a picture of perfection, Minnesota's affidavit of
merit statute helps to protect unsophisticated litigants. The de
mand requirement ensures that litigants are aware of the need to
procure affidavits of merit to prevent dismissal of their claims. By
allowing amendment of procedurally defective complaints, Con
necticut trial courts can achieve the same effect.
Such an interpretation has been reached by Illinois in the face
of virtually identical language. In noting the disastrous implications
of a rigid interpretation, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a rule
that allows the trial courts to determine whether leave to amend
should be granted. Adopting such a rule in Connecticut would pre
vent frivolous lawsuits from proceeding, while simultaneously en
suring that meritorious-yet temporarily procedurally deficient
complaints may proceed. This should be the goal of any state's
rules of procedure.
Brett f. Blank

242.

See Stroub, supra note 100, at 279.

